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Abstract. This paper proposes a method to construct composite index, which is a linear 
combination of several variables, by deriving weights on the criterion of Shapley value 
(from cooperative game theory) that a constituent variable has in making the composite 
index.  In practice it is found oftentimes that the most common method of principal 
component analysis has a tendency to ignore (or poorly weigh) those constituent variables 
that do not have strong correlation with the sister variables. This elitist nature of PCA 
forces a compromise upon the analyst’s desire and need to incorporate those weakly 
correlated (but theoretically and practically important) variables into the composite index. 
In that case, one must construct a composite index that is more inclusive in nature. The 
Shapley value based composite index meets that requirement.  
Keywords. Shapley value, Composite index, Principal Component Analysis, Inclusive 
indices, Global optimization. 
JEL. C43, C63, C71. 
 
1. Introduction 
large body of literature is available on the methods to construct a 
composite index, a linear, weighted, combination of a host of indicator 
variables, which are its constituents. Perhaps, the credit for devising a 
method of the principal component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of 
multivariate data goes to Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933a; 1933b) and its first 
application to construction of a composite index may be attributed to Adelman & 
Morris (1967) followed by Chatttopadhyay & Pal (1972). Booysen (2002) provides 
a discussion of application of composite index for quantifying socio-economic 
development. Some other notable contributions include Salzman (2003), OECD 
(2003), Nardo et al. (2005), Munda & Nardo (2005) and Saltelli (2007). On the 
methodological side, Somarriba and  Pena (2009) and Montero et al. (2010) used  
weights based on Pena distance and partial R
2
 rather than those based on the 
leading eigenvalue and the associated eigenvector as done in the principal 
component analysis. Mishra (2007a; 2007b; 2009) advocated for deriving  weights 
by maximizing absolute or minimum non-Euclidean norm (unlike the principal 
component analysis that maximizes the Euclidean norm) of correlation coefficients 
between the composite index and its constituent variables to make the composite 
index more inclusive and less prone to outliers. 
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2. Weight assignment for making linear combination 
A composite index is Z = Xw, where X are the constituent variables, m in 
number with n replicates/observations, w is the weight vector with m elements and 
the combination Z is an array of n elements. The methodological issue lies in how 
w is determined. The principal component analysis obtains w such that the 
Euclidean norm of correlation between Z and X is maximized. That amounts to 
maximization of 2 2
1 1
( , ) ( , )
m m
j jj j
r Z x r Xw x
 
   with w being the decision 
variables. Instead, Mishra (2007a, 2007b and 2009) proposed to maximize 
1
(Xw, )
m
jj
r x
 which is the absolute norm or maximize the minimum norm, minj
( (Xw, )jr x . The principal component weights have a tendency to undermine those 
constituent variables that are poorly correlated with the sister variables. The 
weights based on absolute norm are relatively more accommodative or inclusive to 
such poorly correlated variable while the min norm weights are most inclusive in 
nature. When Pena’s method is used for determining weights, 
1 1w  and 
2
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while 
jx is regressed on all other kx for which the index k j until 1.k  Thus, 
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3. The objective of this paper 
The objective of this paper is to propose for working out of weights, ,w  in 
Z Xw such that the Euclidean norm of ( , ); j 1,mjs Z x  is minimized. Here ( , )js Z x
is the Shapley value of 
jx in explaining .Z  Minimization of the Euclidean norm of 
( , ); j 1,mjs Z x  is proposed in order to ensure the maximum possible participation 
of all constituent variables in making Z.  The weights, which are the decision 
variables, are constrained to be non-negative.  These criteria ensure that the 
composite index is constructed by assigning weights to the constituent variables 
such that the contribution of each constituent variable, measured in terms of 
Shapley value, is non-negative, and most equitable 
 
4. Algorithm 
We set up a minimization problem  2
1
( ) ( , )
m
jj
f w s Xw x

  with 1/iw m i   to 
initialize. With this initial w  we work out ( ).f w  An appropriate algorithm to find 
out ( , )js Z x j is available (Lipovetsky, 2006; Mishra, 2016). Then, in a non-
negative domain, we suitably search for ,w evaluating ( )f w at every move until 
minimal ( )f w is obtained.  
 
5. Implementation 
For the purpose of demonstration, we implement our proposed algorithm on the 
data provided by Sarker et al. (2006), reproduced in the appendix (Table-A1). The 
data pertain to human development indicators; life expectancy (LE), education 
(ED), per capita income (PCI) and a measure of equality (EQ) for 125 countries.  
After setting up the ( ),f w optimization has been done by the Host-Parasite Co-
Evolutionary algorithm, which is a biologically-inspired algorithm for global 
optimization (Mishra, 2013). Shapley values have been computed by the computer 
program in Mishra (2016). 
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Table 1. Particulars of Shapley-value based Composite Index and Other Statistics 
Particulars LE ED PCI EQ 
Weights (w) 0.20992004 0.52962171 0.49131553 0.65881975 
Shapley value (s) 0.25022641 0.24951509 0.25051323 0.24974528 
Beta values (β) 0.140 0.353 0.328 0.440 
Correlation with Z 0.864 0.826 0.838 0.711 
Correlation with PCA Score 0.924 0.870 0.890 0.568 
 
The composite index (Z) has been reported in Table-A2 in the Appendix. If we 
regress Z on LE, ED, PCI and EQ, i.e.  Z = β1 LE + β2 ED + β3 PCI + β4 EQ + u, 
we cannot retrieve weights due to multicollinearity among the regressors, although 
R
2
=1.  However, we note (Table-1) that Shapley values are almost equal which 
indicates that all the constituent variables have contributed almost equally in 
making Z. It may also be noted that weights assigned to different variables in 
making Z are not even close to being equal. Correlation coefficients of Z with 
different constituent variables are quite high. If the composite index were 
constructed by the principal component analysis (PCA Score), its correlation would 
have been more in favour of LE, ED and PCI and less in favour of EQ. Shapley 
value based composite index has highlighted the contribution of EQ in the 
composite (human development) index.  
 
6. Correlation of various composite indices among 
themselves and the constituent variables 
In Table-2 we present the coefficients of correlation among different alternative 
composite indices and the constituent variables. We have considered four different 
alternative composite indices, HDI2 (the leading principal component score, that 
maximizes the sum of squared correlation coefficients or the squared Euclidean 
norm between the composite index and the constituent variables), HDI1 (based on 
maximization of absolute norm of correlation coefficients between the composite 
index and the constituent variables), HDIPena (that is derived by applying the 
Pena-distance based weights to different constituent variables in accordance with 
partial R
2
) and HDISap (based on the criterion that the composite index should be 
constructed by assigning weights to the constituent variables such that the 
contribution of each constituent variable, measured in terms of Shapley value, is 
positive, or at least non-negative, and most equitable).  
We observe that HDI2 is closest to HDI1 (having the highest correlation between 
them), followed by HDIPena and HDISap. It also maximized the sum of squared 
correlation between itself and the constituent variable (SS_COR), as it has been 
derived to have that property. HDI1 maximizes the sum of the magnitude of 
correlation coefficients between itself and the S_COR into constituent variables 
(S_COR, as has been designed to do so) and has stronger correlation with HDISap 
(than HDIPena). HDIPena is closer to HDI2 on the principle of SS_COR, but 
farther from it on the principle of S_COR. However, HDISap is closer to HDI1 on 
the S_COR criterion, but farther from it on the SS_COR criterion. What emerges is 
that HDISap is a more inclusive composite index than HDIPena. In another sense, 
HDI2 and HDIPena are more elitist composite indices (prone to maximize 
representation regardless of best possible representation of the variables having 
lesser explanatory capability), while HDI1 and HDISap are more inclusive (caring 
for the representation of those variables that have lesser explanatory capability). 
This outcome is expected because HDI1 and HDISap have been designed to be 
more inclusive.  
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Table 2. Correlation of various composite indices among themselves and the constituent 
variables 
 HDI2 HDI1 HDIPena HDISap LE ED PCI EQ SS_COR S_COR 
HDI2 1 0.996 0.978 0.978 0.924 0.870 0.890 0.568 2.7254 3.252 
HDI1 0.996 1 0.990 0.992 0.915 0.844 0.866 0.640 2.7091 3.265 
HDIPena 0.978 0.990 1 0.982 0.937 0.779 0.811 0.704 2.6381 3.231 
SDISap 0.978 0.992 0.982 1 0.864 0.826 0.838 0.711 2.6365 3.239 
LE 0.924 0.915 0.937 0.864 1 0.729 0.764 0.492 - - 
ED 0.870 0.844 0.779 0.826 0.729 1 0.750 0.283 - - 
PCI 0.890 0.866 0.811 0.838 0.764 0.750 1 0.313 - - 
EQ 0.568 0.640 0.704 0.711 0.492 0.283 0.313 1 - - 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The use of Shapley value criterion to construct composite index adds to the 
methodology of representing indicator variables by a single composite index. The 
index so derived is inclusive rather than elitist in nature. In practice it is found 
oftentimes that the most common method of principal component analysis has a 
tendency to ignore (or poorly weigh) those constituent variables that do not have 
strong correlation with the sister variables. This elitist nature of PCA forces a 
compromise upon the analyst’s desire and need to incorporate those weakly 
correlated (but theoretically and practically important) variables into the composite 
index. In that case, one must construct a composite index that is more inclusive in 
nature. The Shapley value based composite index meets that requirement.    
Computation of Shapley value is inherently combinatorial in nature and it 
becomes increasingly demanding (computational power and time) when the 
number of variables under analysis increases beyond 15 or so. The method 
proposed here partakes of this difficulty. This difficulty may, to some extent, be 
overcome by grouping the constituent variables into several clusters (coalitions that 
might or might not be hierarchical, but they are structured).  By the way, it may be 
mentioned that the practice of grouping and construction of a composite index at 
two steps or stages is prevalent even among those who use the PCA for 
constructing a composite index (e.g. Chattopadhyay & Pal, 1972; Dreher in KOF, 
2012). Evidently, as pointed out by Mishra (2012), this procedure is suboptimal on 
account of ignoring the correlation among the constituent variables across the 
groups.   
Grouping of constituent variables into clusters (or coalitions, so to say) may 
require the use of Owen value (Owen, 1977) which is a generalization of Shapley 
value for games with coalition structure having super-additive properties. Super-
additivity may arise on account of cooperation among the coalitions (or their 
members across the coalitions). In this regard, some work on cooperative games 
with coalition structure (such as Huettner (2010), Calvoy & Gutiérrezz (2011), 
Liben-Nowell et al. (2012), etc.) may be helpful. Therefore, it requires further 
research.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Human Development  Indicators (From Sarker et al., 2006) 
Country LE ED PCI EQ Country LE ED PCI EQ 
Norway 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.96 Turkey 0.76 0.80 0.69 0.66 
Sweden 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.98 Azerbaijan 0.78 0.88 0.58 0.73 
Canada 0.90 0.98 0.95 0.81 Jordan 0.76 0.86 0.62 0.74 
Netherlands 0.89 0.99 0.95 0.82 Tunisia 0.79 0.74 0.70 0.66 
Australia 0.90 0.99 0.94 0.76 China 0.76 0.83 0.64 0.56 
Belgium 0.90 0.99 0.94 0.98 Georgia 0.81 0.89 0.52 0.73 
United_States 0.87 0.97 0.98 0.64 Dominican_Republi 0.70 0.82 0.70 0.50 
Japan 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.98 Sri_Lanka 0.79 0.83 0.60 0.78 
Luxembourg 0.89 0.91 1.00 0.86 Ecuador 0.76 0.85 0.60 0.58 
Ireland 0.86 0.96 0.98 0.75 Iran_Islamic_Rep. 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.60 
Switzerland 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.81 El_Salvador 0.76 0.75 0.65 0.38 
Austria 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.87 Guyana 0.64 0.89 0.63 0.59 
United_Kingdom 0.88 0.99 0.93 0.74 Uzbekistan 0.74 0.91 0.47 0.94 
Finland 0.88 0.99 0.93 0.94 Algeria 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.76 
Denmark 0.86 0.98 0.96 0.99 Kyrgyzstan 0.72 0.92 0.46 0.89 
France 0.90 0.96 0.93 0.81 Indonesia 0.69 0.80 0.58 0.78 
New_Zealand 0.89 0.99 0.90 0.74 Viet_Nam 0.73 0.82 0.52 0.74 
Germany 0.89 0.95 0.94 0.91 Moldova_Rep_of 0.73 0.87 0.45 0.74 
Spain 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.82 Bolivia 0.64 0.86 0.53 0.56 
Italy 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.74 Honduras 0.73 0.74 0.54 0.34 
Israel 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.76 Tajikistan 0.73 0.90 0.38 0.77 
Singapore 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.61 Nicaragua 0.74 0.73 0.54 0.34 
Greece 0.89 0.95 0.87 0.76 Mongolia 0.64 0.89 0.47 0.57 
Hong_Kong_China 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.59 South_Africa 0.40 0.83 0.77 0.25 
Portugal 0.85 0.97 0.87 0.69 Egypt 0.73 0.62 0.61 0.78 
Slovenia 0.85 0.96 0.87 0.91 Guatemala 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.48 
Korea_Rep_of 0.84 0.97 0.86 0.84 Morocco 0.72 0.53 0.61 0.67 
Czech_Republic 0.84 0.92 0.84 0.97 Namibia 0.34 0.79 0.69 0.00 
Argentina 0.82 0.96 0.78 0.40 India 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.82 
Estonia 0.78 0.98 0.80 0.72 Botswana 0.27 0.76 0.73 0.17 
Poland 0.81 0.96 0.78 0.84 Ghana 0.55 0.65 0.51 0.87 
Hungary 0.78 0.95 0.82 1.00 Cambodia 0.54 0.66 0.50 0.65 
Slovakia 0.81 0.91 0.81 0.96 Papua_New_Guine 0.54 0.57 0.52 0.43 
Lithuania 0.79 0.96 0.77 0.83 Lao_People's_Dem. 0.49 0.64 0.47 0.72 
Chile 0.85 0.90 0.77 0.30 Swaziland 0.18 0.74 0.64 0.21 
Uruguay 0.84 0.94 0.73 0.56 Bangladesh 0.60 0.45 0.47 0.83 
Costa_Rica 0.88 0.87 0.75 0.52 Nepal 0.58 0.50 0.44 0.73 
Croatia 0.82 0.90 0.77 0.89 Cameroon 0.36 0.64 0.50 0.56 
Latvia 0.76 0.95 0.75 0.82 Pakistan 0.60 0.40 0.49 0.81 
Mexico 0.81 0.85 0.75 0.35 Lesotho 0.19 0.76 0.53 0.17 
Trinidad_and_Tobag 0.77 0.87 0.76 0.65 Uganda 0.34 0.70 0.44 0.60 
Bulgaria 0.77 0.91 0.71 0.83 Zimbabwe 0.15 0.79 0.53 0.30 
Malaysia 0.80 0.83 0.75 0.46 Kenya 0.34 0.74 0.39 0.56 
Russian_Federation 0.69 0.95 0.74 0.54 Yemen 0.58 0.50 0.36 0.80 
Macedonia_TFYR 0.81 0.87 0.70 0.91 Madagascar 0.47 0.60 0.33 0.50 
Panama 0.83 0.86 0.69 0.31 Nigeria 0.44 0.59 0.36 0.43 
Belarus 0.75 0.95 0.67 0.86 Mauritania 0.45 0.42 0.52 0.68 
Albania 0.81 0.89 0.65 0.91 Gambia 0.48 0.40 0.47 0.70 
Bosnia_and_Herzeg 0.82 0.84 0.68 0.95 Senegal 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.63 
Venezuela 0.81 0.86 0.67 0.47 Guinea 0.40 0.37 0.51 0.65 
Romania 0.76 0.88 0.70 0.87 Tanzania_U_Rep. 0.31 0.62 0.29 0.70 
Ukraine 0.74 0.94 0.65 0.89 Cote_d_Ivoire 0.27 0.47 0.45 0.55 
Saint_Lucia 0.79 0.88 0.66 0.60 Zambia 0.13 0.68 0.36 0.39 
Brazil 0.72 0.88 0.73 0.25 Malawi 0.21 0.66 0.29 0.44 
Colombia 0.78 0.84 0.69 0.29 Central_African_Re 0.25 0.43 0.41 0.21 
Thailand 0.74 0.86 0.71 0.59 Ethiopia 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.87 
Kazakhstan 0.69 0.93 0.68 0.84 Mozambique 0.22 0.45 0.39 0.67 
Jamaica 0.84 0.83 0.61 0.70 Guinea-Bissau 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.51 
Armenia 0.79 0.90 0.57 0.70 Burundi 0.26 0.45 0.31 0.80 
Philippines 0.75 0.89 0.62 0.53 Mali 0.39 0.21 0.37 0.44 
Turkmenistan 0.70 0.93 0.63 0.64 Burkina_Faso 0.35 0.16 0.40 0.49 
Paraguay 0.76 0.85 0.64 0.30 Niger 0.35 0.18 0.35 0.44 
Peru 0.74 0.86 0.65 0.45 Note: From Sarker et al (2006) 
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Table A2. Different Types of Composit Indices of Human Development  
Country 
HDI2 HDI1 
HDIPen
a 
HDISA
P 
Country 
HDI2 HDI1 
HDIPen
a 
HDISA
P 
Norway 0.96 0.96 0.9959 1.6914 Turkey 0.73 0.73 0.6578 0.1298 
Sweden 0.95 0.95 1.0000 1.6426 Azerbaijan 0.74 0.74 0.6890 0.2414 
Canada 0.92 0.91 0.9182 1.2984 Jordan 0.74 0.74 0.6876 0.2812 
Netherlands 0.92 0.92 0.9190 1.3302 Tunisia 0.73 0.72 0.6637 0.0588 
Australia 0.91 0.90 0.8964 1.1972 China 0.71 0.70 0.6084 -0.1062 
Belgium 0.95 0.95 0.9910 1.6465 Georgia 0.73 0.73 0.6928 0.1763 
United_States 0.89 0.87 0.8332 0.9648 Dominican_Republic 0.70 0.68 0.5613 -0.1835 
Japan 0.94 0.95 0.9997 1.5658 Sri_Lanka 0.74 0.75 0.7098 0.2944 
Luxembourg 0.92 0.92 0.9305 1.3537 Ecuador 0.71 0.70 0.6110 -0.0979 
Ireland 0.90 0.89 0.8722 1.1649 Iran_Islamic_Rep_of 0.71 0.70 0.6144 -0.0902 
Switzerland 0.91 0.90 0.9110 1.2444 El_Salvador 0.66 0.64 0.5145 -0.6006 
Austria 0.92 0.92 0.9333 1.3784 Guyana 0.70 0.69 0.5626 -0.0333 
United_Kingdom 0.90 0.89 0.8733 1.1259 Uzbekistan 0.74 0.76 0.7332 0.5093 
Finland 0.93 0.94 0.9593 1.5344 Algeria 0.71 0.72 0.6599 0.1057 
Denmark 0.94 0.95 0.9748 1.6568 Kyrgyzstan 0.73 0.74 0.6996 0.3948 
France 0.91 0.90 0.9080 1.2281 Indonesia 0.70 0.71 0.6384 0.1401 
New_Zealand 0.90 0.88 0.8711 1.0811 Viet_Nam 0.70 0.70 0.6333 0.0179 
Germany 0.92 0.92 0.9454 1.4249 Moldova_Rep_of 0.69 0.69 0.6263 -0.0121 
Spain 0.91 0.90 0.9065 1.2151 Bolivia 0.66 0.65 0.5154 -0.3201 
Italy 0.89 0.88 0.8648 1.0246 Honduras 0.61 0.59 0.4475 -0.9087 
Israel 0.88 0.87 0.8681 1.0043 Tajikistan 0.68 0.69 0.6274 -0.0169 
Singapore 0.86 0.83 0.7955 0.6993 Nicaragua 0.61 0.59 0.4510 -0.9201 
Greece 0.88 0.87 0.8619 0.9985 Mongolia 0.65 0.64 0.5106 -0.3485 
Hong_Kong_China 0.85 0.83 0.7952 0.6054 South_Africa 0.60 0.57 0.2990 -0.7543 
Portugal 0.86 0.85 0.8132 0.8651 Egypt 0.67 0.68 0.6268 -0.1060 
Slovenia 0.90 0.90 0.9053 1.2965 Guatemala 0.62 0.61 0.4784 -0.6807 
Korea_Rep_of 0.88 0.88 0.8691 1.1477 Morocco 0.63 0.63 0.5520 -0.4993 
Czech_Republic 0.88 0.89 0.9075 1.2890 Namibia 0.51 0.47 0.1250 -1.5137 
Argentina 0.78 0.75 0.6441 0.0807 India 0.63 0.65 0.5677 -0.2407 
Estonia 0.83 0.82 0.7684 0.7781 Botswana 0.52 0.50 0.1606 -1.1982 
Poland 0.85 0.85 0.8274 0.9728 Ghana 0.62 0.64 0.5399 -0.1586 
Hungary 0.87 0.89 0.8870 1.3303 Cambodia 0.58 0.59 0.4391 -0.6137 
Slovakia 0.86 0.87 0.8751 1.1793 Papua_New_Guinea 0.52 0.52 0.3283 -1.1907 
Lithuania 0.84 0.84 0.8086 0.9220 Lao_People's_Dem 0.56 0.58 0.4269 -0.5912 
Chile 0.75 0.71 0.6016 -0.2288 Swaziland 0.47 0.45 0.0957 -1.3662 
Uruguay 0.79 0.77 0.7062 0.2990 Bangladesh 0.56 0.58 0.4932 -0.6358 
Costa_Rica 0.78 0.76 0.7011 0.1520 Nepal 0.54 0.56 0.4423 -0.8147 
Croatia 0.84 0.84 0.8376 0.9564 Cameroon 0.51 0.52 0.2899 -0.9525 
Latvia 0.82 0.82 0.7789 0.8294 Pakistan 0.55 0.57 0.4780 -0.7324 
Mexico 0.73 0.70 0.5821 -0.2774 Lesotho 0.44 0.42 0.0594 -1.5939 
Trinidad_and_Tobago 0.77 0.76 0.6951 0.3620 Uganda 0.51 0.52 0.2935 -0.8789 
Bulgaria 0.80 0.80 0.7686 0.7159 Zimbabwe 0.46 0.45 0.0990 -1.3009 
Malaysia 0.74 0.71 0.6187 -0.0954 Kenya 0.50 0.51 0.2724 -0.9743 
Russian_Federation 0.75 0.74 0.6147 0.1942 Yemen 0.53 0.55 0.4507 -0.8089 
Macedonia_TFYR 0.81 0.82 0.8141 0.8166 Madagascar 0.47 0.47 0.2730 -1.3658 
Panama 0.71 0.68 0.5628 -0.4308 Nigeria 0.46 0.46 0.2311 -1.4951 
Belarus 0.80 0.81 0.7685 0.7674 Mauritania 0.50 0.52 0.3469 -1.0096 
Albania 0.80 0.81 0.8054 0.7669 Gambia 0.49 0.51 0.3548 -1.0706 
Bosnia_and_Herzego 0.81 0.82 0.8246 0.8166 Senegal 0.47 0.48 0.3078 -1.2619 
Venezuela 0.73 0.71 0.6144 -0.1515 Guinea 0.46 0.48 0.2899 -1.2110 
Romania 0.79 0.80 0.7700 0.7198 Tanzania_U_Rep_of 0.45 0.48 0.2590 -1.0956 
Ukraine 0.79 0.80 0.7677 0.7697 Cote_d_Ivoire 0.42 0.44 0.1784 -1.4240 
Saint_Lucia 0.75 0.73 0.6607 0.1196 Zambia 0.39 0.39 0.0534 -1.6197 
Brazil 0.69 0.65 0.4881 -0.5214 Malawi 0.39 0.40 0.0981 -1.6207 
Colombia 0.69 0.66 0.5201 -0.5407 Central_African_Re 0.34 0.33 0.0000 -2.2722 
Thailand 0.74 0.73 0.6358 0.1159 Ethiopia 0.44 0.48 0.3080 -1.0568 
Kazakhstan 0.78 0.78 0.7226 0.6680 Mozambique 0.41 0.43 0.1795 -1.3509 
Jamaica 0.75 0.74 0.7075 0.1812 Guinea-Bissau 0.38 0.39 0.1505 -1.8092 
Armenia 0.74 0.74 0.6841 0.2056 Burundi 0.42 0.45 0.2372 -1.1961 
Philippines 0.71 0.70 0.5987 -0.1003 Mali 0.34 0.35 0.1174 -2.1745 
Turkmenistan 0.73 0.73 0.6289 0.1804 Burkina_Faso 0.34 0.35 0.1115 -2.1374 
Paraguay 0.67 0.64 0.5015 -0.6012 Niger 0.32 0.33 0.0813 -2.2892 
Peru 0.70 0.68 0.5593 -0.2729      
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